Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2001

Salt Lake City v. International Association of
Firefighters : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jerry W. James; Irvine, Smith, and Mabey; Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants.
Roger F. Cutler; Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Salt Lake City v. International Association of Firefighters, No. 14689.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1578

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

It-b&1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY, a Utah
municipal corporation,
et al,
PlaintiffsRespondents ,

REPLY BRIEF
Civil No. 14689

v.
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF FIREFIGHTERS, LOCALS 1645,
593, 1654, and 2064,
Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal taken from the District Court of the
Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, Judge Sawaya presiding.

REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS

Jerry W. James
IRVINE SMITH & MABEY
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
225 South 200 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-4111
Roger F. Cutler
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents
101 City and County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 328-7788

FEB 11 1977
pier!:, Supronva
Court, by
Utah
Digitized
the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY, a Utah
municipal corporation,
et al,
PlaintiffsRespondents ,

REPLY BRIEF
Civil No. 14689

v.
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF FIREFIGHTERS, LOCALS 1645,
593, 1654, and 2064,
DefendantsAppellants.

Appeal taken from the District Court of the
Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, Judge Sawaya presiding.

REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS

Jerry W. James
IRVINE SMITH & MABEY
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
225 South 200 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-4111
Roger F. Cutler
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents
101 City and County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 328-7788
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
INDEX OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED.
ARGUMENT I: THE STATEMENT OF FACTS FOUND IN
PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF (1) POLITICIZES THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED ON THIS APPEAL AND
(2) IS BASED ON SPECULATIVE FACTUAL AND LEGAL
ASSUMPTIONS.
ARGUMENT II: NEITHER FIREFIGHTER/CITY
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NOR COMPULSORY ARBITRATION OF FIREFIGHTER/CITY COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING DISPUTES CONSTITUTE MUNICIPAL
FUNCTIONS AND, THEREFORE, THE UTAH FIREFIGHTERS NEGOTIATIONS ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE VI § 28.
(1)

i
iii

1

10

Plaintiffs have confused their Utah
Constitution, Article VI § 28 argument
with other constitutional arguments.

10

Cases cited by plaintiffs in support
of their assertion that the Act violates
Utah Constitution, Article VI § 28 are
not compelling.

13

ARGUMENT III: THE UTAH FIREFIGHTERS NEGOTIATIONS ACT IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY GROUNDS.

31

ARGUMENT IV: PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM THAT THE UTAH
FIREFIGHTERS NEGOTIATIONS ACT'S DELEGATION OF
STATE LEGISLATIVE POWER IS WITHOUT ADEQUATE
STANDARDS AND IS, THEREFORE, UNCONSTITUTIONAL
WAS NEITHER PLED NOR ARGUED IN THE LOWER COURT
AND IS, THEREFORE, IMPROPERLY RAISED FOR THE
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.

35

ARGUMENT V: THE UTAH FIREFIGHTERS NEGOTIATIONS ACT DOES NOT DELEGATE STATE LEGISLATIVE
POWER, AND, IF THE ACT DOES DELEGATE STATE
LEGISLATIVE POWER, ADEQUATE STANDARDS ACCOMPANY THAT DELEGATION.

37

(2)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGUMENT V I : THE UTAH FIREFIGHTERS NEGOTIATIONS ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION
GUARANTEES OF EITHER THE UTAH OR UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION.
(1)
(2)

46

Plaintiffs do not have, standing to
raise the equal protection issue.

46

The Act does not unreasonably discriminate between firefighters and other
municipal employees.

49

ARGUMENT VII: THE UTAH FIREFIGHTERS NEGOTIATIONS ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE ONE-PERSON
ONE-VOTE RULE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

53

CONCLUSION.

54

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED
Page
CASES:
Allgood v. Larson, 545 P.2d 530 (Utah 1976)

24, 28 '

City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 332 N.E.2d 290
(New York 1975)

54

City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 362 N.Y.S.2d 698 (Sup.
Ct. 1974) 54

54

Backman v. Salt Lake County, 375 P.2d 756 (Utah
1962)

47

Branch v. Albee, 142 P. 598 (Ore. 1914)

22

California School Employees Association v.
Personnel Commission, 474 P.2d 4 36 (Cal. 1975)

19

Carson v. Douglas, 36 7 P.2d 462 (Utah 1962)

36

City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Association,
304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973)

11

City of Beaverton v. International Association of
Fire Fighters, Local 1660, Beaverton Shop, 531 P.2d
730 (Ore. Ct. App. 1975)
16, 20
City of East Providence v. Local 850, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO,
366 A.2d 1151 (R.I. 1976)
"
~

43

City of Everett v. Fire Fighters, Local No. 350 of
the International Association of Fire Fighters,
555 P.2d 418 (Wash. 1976)
15, 21, 38
City of Spokane v. Spokane Police Guild, 553
P.2d 1316 (Wash. 1976)
9, 14, 53
Clayton v. Bennett, 298 P.2d 531 (Utah 1956)

39, 40, 41

Dearborn Fire Fighters Union, Local No. 412,
I.A.F.F. v. City of Dearborn, 231 N.W.2d
226 (Mich. 1975)
'

8, 11, 25
27, 31, 53

Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1937)

40

Fairview Hospital Association v. Public Bldg.
Ser. & Hosp. Employees Union Local 113,
64 N.W.2d 16 (1954)
-

43

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Fire Fighters Union, Local 1186, I.A.F.F. v.
City of Vallejo, 526 P.2d 971 (Cal. 1974)

6, 44

Flemetis v. McArthur, 226 P.2d 124 (Utah 1951)

36

Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island Ranching
Company, 414 P.2d 963 (Utah 1966)

2, 34

Greeley Police Union v. City Council of
Greeley, 553 P.2d 790 (Colo. 1976)

1 6 , 23
2 6 , 31

Harney v. Russo, 255 A.2d 560 (Pa. 1969)

4 3 , 54

Huber v. Deep Creek Irrigation Co., 305 P.2d
478 (Utah 1956)

36

Huff v. Mayor and City Council of Colorado
Springs, 512 P.2d 632 (Colo. 1973)

25

Huntington Beach Police Officers' Association
v. City of Huntington Beach, 129 Cal. Rptr.
893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)

19

Illinois Assn. of Fire Fighters, Local 73 v.
City of Waukegan, 226 N.E.2d 606 (111. 1967)

48

In re Estate of Ekker, 432 P.2d 45 (Utah 1967)

36

Johnson v. Doran, 540 P.2d 306 (Mont. 1975)

36

Kesler and Sons Construction Co. v. Utah State
Division of Health, 513 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1973)

42

Knudson v. Hilzer, 551 P.2d 680 (Wyo. 1976)

36

~

Lauren W. Gibbs v. Monson, 129 P.2d 887 (Utah 1942)

42

Littleton Education Association v. Arapahoe County
School District, 553 P.2d 793 (Colo. 1976)

26

Lloyd A. Fry Co. v. Utah Air Conservation
Committee, 545 P.2d 495 (Utah 1975)

41, 45

Lyon v. Bateman, 228 P.2d 818 (Utah 1951)

47

Main Parking Mall v. Salt Lake City Corp., 531 P.2d
866 (Utah 1975)

47

Peoples National Bank of Washington v. Peterson,
514 P.2d 159 (Wash. 1973)
"

37

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Pontiac Police Officers Association v. City
of Pontiac, 246 N.W.2d 831 (Mich. 1976)
Produce Refrigerator Co. v. Norwich Union Fire
Ins. Soc., 97 N.W. 875 (Minn. 1904)
Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los
Angeles, 384 P.2d 158 (Cal. 1963)

26, 44
38
15, 18
20, 49

Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co. v. Lake
Washington Shipyards, 96 P.2d 257 (Wash. 1939)

38

Revne v. Trade Commission, 192 P.2d 563 (Utah 1948)

39

San Francisco Firefighters Local 798, I.A.F.F.,
AFL-CIO v. City and County of San Francisco^
129 Cal. Rptr. 39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)

16, 18

State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local No. 946,
I.A.F.F. v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295
(Wyo. 1968)

38, 43

State v. Bruno, 378 P.2d 691 (Wash. 1963)

37

Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 470 P.2d 399
(Utah 1970)

36

Skelton v. Lees, 329 P.2d 389 (Utah 1958)

41

State ex rel. Heinig v. City of Milwaukie, 373
P.2d 680 (Ore. 1962)

21, 22

State ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool, 441
S.W. 2d 35 (Mo. 1969)

50

State v. Johnson, 278 P.2d 662 (Wash. 1955)

13, 16

Talps v. Arreola, 521 P.2d 206 (Wash. 1974)

37

Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 197 P.2d
477 (Utah 1948)

2

Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation and
Arbitration, 352 N.E.2d 914 (Mass. 1976)

2, 27
33, 54

Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 446
P.2d 958 (Utah 1968)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

v

2, 34

Page
Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., 540 P.2d
499 (Utah 1975)

18, 22, 23

Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 375 P.2d 456
(Utah 1962)

36

Vaughn v. Murray, 521 P.2d 262 (Kan. 1974)

37

Wagner v. Olsen, 482 P.2d 702 (Utah 1971)

36

Warren v. Marion County, 353 P.2d 257 (Ore. 1960)

45

Wood v. Budge, 374 P.2d 516 (Utah 1962)

34

CONSTITUTIONS:
California Constitution, Article XI § 13

17

Colorado Constitution, Article XXI § 4

31

Utah Constitution, Article VI § 28

10, 11, 12,
13, 16, 17

Utah Constitution, Article XVI § 8

33, 35

STATUTES;
Utah Code Ann. § 34-20a-3 (Supp. 1975)

4, 44

Utah Code Ann. § 34-20a-4 (Supp. 1975)

52

Utah Code Ann. § 34-20a-5 (Supp. 1975)

44

Utah Code Ann. § 34-20a-8 (Supp. 1975)

45

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46-3(1) (Supp. 1975)

45

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46-4 (b) (Supp. 1975)

45-46

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46-4(c) (Supp. 1975)

45-46

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46-4(d) (Supp. 1975)

46

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46-9 (Supp. 1975)

46

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46-11 (Supp. 1975)

46

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-2 (1953)

46

Utah Code Ann, § 78-33-11 (1953)

46

SECONDARY AUTHORITIES:
1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 2.09
(1958)
j
"" "
2 McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations
§ 10.39 (3rd ed. 1966)
H. Sherman and W. Murphy, Labor Relations and
Social Problems: Unionization and Collective
Bargaining (19751
L. Bernstein, "Alternatives to the Strike in
Public Labor Relations/1 85 Harv. L. Rev. 459
(1971)
E. G. Gee, "Organizing the Halls of Ivy: Developing
a Framework for Viable Alternatives in Higher
Education Employment," 1973 Utah L. Rev. 233

45

19

8
31

30

A. McAvoy, "Binding Arbitration of Contract Terms:
A New Approach to the Resolution of Disputes in the
Public Sector," 72 Cal. L. Rev. 1192 (1972)
5, 39

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

vii

ARGUMENT I
THE STATEMENT OF FACTS FOUND IN PLAINTIFFS' BRIEFl
(1) POLITICIZES THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED ON THIS
APPEAL AND (2) IS BASED ON SPECULATIVE FACTUAL AND LEGAL
ASSUMPTIONS.
The statement of "facts" found in plaintiffs1 Brief
is unreliable for two reasons:

(1) It politicizes the

constitutional issues raised on this appeal, and (2) it is
based on speculative factual and legal assumptions.
Defendants specifically asked plaintiffs to refrain
from politicizing the constitutional issues raised on this appeal.
See defendants' Brief at 30-31.

Unlike plaintiffs, defendants

have no desire to debate the social, economic, and political
vices or virtues of the Utah Firefighters Negotiations Act before
the Court.

Defendants debated the social, economic, and

political vices and virtues of the Act before the Utah Legislature and won.

That debate is ended.

The constitutionality—

not the social, economic, and political wisdom—of the Act has
now been challenged in the judicial arena.

Defendants suggest

that argument in the judicial arena should be conducted—not
on terms which require legislative fact-finding, policy-making,

x

For convenience, defendants-appellants will be hereinafter
referred to as defendants; plaintiffs-respondents will be
hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs; the Utah Firefighters
Negotiations Act will be hereinafter referred to as the Act
or the Utah Act; defendants1 original Brief will be hereinafter referred to as defendants1 Brief; and plaintiffs'
original Brief will be hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs1
Brief.
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and value judgments—but rather on terms more amenable to
judicial management and resolution.

This suggestion is

supported by this Court's history of judicial restraint
with respect to judicial review of. legislative enactments.
If by any fair interpretation of the statute
the legislation can be upheldf it is the duty of
this Court to sustain it, even though judges may
view the Act as inopportune or unwise, and it is
not within the province of the judiciary to question
the wisdom or the motives of the Legislature in
the enactment of a statute. Thomas v. Daughters
of Utah Pioneers, 197 P.2d 477, 499 (Utah 1948)
(J. Latimer, concurring opinion).
We are not concerned with considerations as to
the advisability or the practicability of this
Act. The question as to the wisdom of the project
is for the legislature. As this Court has heretofore stated, there is undoubtedly plenty of room
within the limits of constitutional power for legislation which may be considered by some as illadvised, improvident or unwise. But the legislature is the voice of the people who hold the
plenary power of government except as limited by
the Constitution. Great Salt Lake Authority v.
Island Ranching Company, 414 P.2d 963, 966 (Utah
In order to preserve the independence and the
integrity of the three branches of government,
it is of the utmost importance that the judicial
[sic] exercise restraint and not intrude on the legis
lative prerogative. It cannot strike down and
nullify a legislative enactment unless it is
clearly and expressly prohibited by the Constitution or in violation of some plain mandate thereof.
The Court must make every reasonable presumption
which favors constitutionality. The Courts have a
duty to investigate and, insofar as possible,
discover any reasonable avenues by which the
statute can be upheld. Every reasonable doubt
must be resolved in favor of the constitutionality
of the statute. Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug
Centers, Inc., 446 F.2d 958, 962 (Utah 1968).
See also, Town of Arlington v. Board of Conciliation and
Arbitration, 352 N.E.2d 914, 921-922 (Mass. 1976).
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Unfortunately, plaintiffs do not agree with this
separation of powers concept or with this Court's definition
of the judiciary's role in the context of that separation of
powers.

Instead, plaintiffs' Brief invites the Court to sub-

stitute its economic and political judgment for the Legislature's economic and political judgment with respect to the
Utah Act.
For instance, plaintiffs emphasize that the Act
was "passed by one vote on the last day of the 1975 general
legislative session," plaintiffs' Brief at 5-6, and plaintiffs
falsely represent that "officers of the plaintiff cities can
be forced into the firefighter bargaining unit, by regular
vote ..." (Emphasis supplied.) plaintiffs' Brief at 3.
Likewise, plaintiffs speculate that the Act will
not promote industrial peace and that only a "tenuous"
relationship exists between the Act's proposed "method"
of bargaining and improved fire protection in plaintiff
municipalities.

See plaintiffs' Brief at 32.

But whether

the Act encourages industrial peace or better fire protection
involves an empirical judgment which this Court must presume
that the Legislature has made favorable to the Act's passage.
Plaintiffs' unsupported speculations cannot rebut this
presumption.
Finally, plaintiffs' appeal to the Court's political instinct is illustrated by their elaborate calculation
of the projected cost to plaintiff municipalities of adopting
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

defendants1 proposed collective bargaining contract.

See

plaintiffs1 Brief at 3-5.
In short, the hyperbolic nature of plaintiffs'
statement of "facts" leaves defendants no alternative but
to expose those "facts" for what they are:

speculative

assumptions which should have no place in the adjudication
of important constitutional issues.
All of the "facts" stated in plaintiffs' Brief at
3-5 UK 3-8 are subject to the following objections:
(a)

Plaintiffs assume that they are required to

bargain with defendants relative to each of the matters
enumerated in plaintiffs' Brief at 3-5 1M[ 3-8.

This assump-

tion is essential to plaintiffs' conclusion that defendants'
proposed collective bargaining contract will cost plaintiff
municipalities an additional $2,896,000.00 per year.
However, the Act requires plaintiffs to bargain
with defendants only relative to "wages, hours, and other
conditions of employment."
1975).

Utah Code Ann. § 34-20a-3 (Supp.

Anything outside the scope of "wages, hours, and

other conditions of employment" would not be a mandatory,
but rather a permissive, bargaining subject.

Naturally, if

a bargaining subject is permissive rather than mandatory/
plaintiff municipalities will not be required to bargain
over it, impasse will never be reached relative to that
bargaining subject, and binding arbitration will never
be imposed relative to that bargaining subject.2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"Wages, hours, and conditions of employment" are
terms of art in labor relations law.
defined by Utah's courts.
defined these terms.

These terms must be

Utah's courts have not yet

Instead of assuming an interpretation

of these terms as "facts" in their Brief, plaintiffs should
await judicial interpretation of these terms by Utah's
courts.
(b)

Even if plaintiffs are required to bargain

with defendants relative to each subject mentioned in plaintiffs' Brief at 3-5 1(11 3-8, plaintiffs' statement of "facts"
assumes that bargaining negotiations will produce no compromises between plaintiffs and defendants.

However, it is not

unrealistic to assume that plaintiffs and defendants will
reach agreements as a result of normal collective bargaining
processes.

Only when an impasse is reached will there be

resort to arbitration; and it is likely that the potential
of an adverse arbitration award will encourage each side to
be conciliatory.

See, e.g., A. McAvoy, "Binding Arbitration

of Contract Terms:

A New Approach to the Resolution of

Disputes in the Public Sector," 72 Col. L. Rev. 1192, 1210
(1972).

^For example, the manning provisions, hiring practices, and
shift regulations discussed in plaintiffs' Brief could all
be adjudicated outside the scope of the Act's "hours and
conditions of employment" language; and, therefore, they would
not be subject to the Act's mandatory bargaining and compulsory arbitration provisions. Pending a definitive judicial
resolution of this issue, plaintiffs cannot argue that the
Act will have the economic effect detailed in their Brief.
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(c)

In addition to assuming that bargaining negotia

tions will reach an impasse and that impasse will be reached
with respect to every subject mentioned in plaintiffs' Brief
at 3-5 1(11 3-8, plaintiffs 1 statement of "facts"
assumes that the arbitration board will decide every impasse
issue in defendants' rather than plaintiffs' favor.

Implicit

in this assumption is a marked antipathy towards arbitrators
as being biased and irresponsible, particularly in matters
affecting city treasuries.

No authority in support of such

antipathy is offered by plaintiffs.

On the contrary, many

courts have recognized arbitration to be a time-honored,
respected method of settling labor disputes.

See, e.g.,

Fire Fighters Union, Local 1186, I.A.F.F. v. City of Vallejo,
526 P.2d 971, 980 (Cal. 1974) ("State policy in California
'favors arbitration provisions in collective bargaining
agreements and recognizes the important part they play in
helping to promote industrial stabilization.'"). See also
defendants' Brief at 17-19.
(d)

If the arbitration board decides any impasse

issue in defendants' favor, plaintiffs' statement of "facts"
assumes that the arbitration board's decision will not be
subject to judicial review for being arbitrary or capricious;
and plaintiffs further assume that if the arbitration board's
decision is subject to judicial review, it will not be
modified in any respect for being arbitrary or capricious.
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(e)

Plaintiffs assume that, even though the

arbitration board's decisions relative to "wage" disputes
are advisory only, the Act's compulsory arbitration provision will (1) apply to many "non-wage matters" which are
actually "wage" matters and (2) will, therefore, produce
catastrophic economic consequences for plaintiff municipalities.

These consequences, according to plaintiffs, are

tantamount to "taxation" of plaintiff municipalities "without
representation."
(1)

By examining many of plaintiffs' "non-wage

matters," the Court can gauge the extent of plaintiffs'
"fact" manipulation on this appeal.

For example, plaintiffs

assert that "overtime provisions" are a "non-wage matter."
See plaintiffs' Brief at 25.

Similarly, plaintiffs assert

that "fringe benefits, such as health and accident insurance,
life insurance, mileage allowance, and related matters"
are "non-wage matters."

See plaintiffs' Brief at 4.

Plaintiffs' assumption that "overtime provisions"
and "fringe benefits" are "non-wage" matters is invalid for
two reasons.
First, available judicial interpretations of the
term "wages" in labor relations law suggests that "base
hourly rates of pay, piece rates, incentive plans, overtime
pay, shift differentials, and severance pay ... a Christmas
bonus paid over a period of years as a percentage of
employees' earnings, pension plans, and insurance plans,
profit sharing and stock purchase plans, merit wage increases,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and the rental of company-owned housing" all may be classified
as "wage" matters.

H. Sherman and W. Murphy, Labor Relations

and Social Problems:
120-121 (1975).

Unionization and Collective Bargaining

If Utah's courts follow this expansive defi-

nition of "wages," plaintiffs' argument that "overtime
provisions" and "fringe benefits" are "non-wage matters"
and that, therefore, an arbitration board's decisions relative
to these matters are binding on plaintiff municipalities
loses its shock value entirely.
Second, "wages" is a term of art in labor relations
law and, therefore, its scope must be defined by Utah's
courts and not ex cathedra by plaintiffs in their Brief.
Until Utah's courts have spoken on this issue, it is unfair
for plaintiffs to speculate that any particular bargaining
subject may or may not involve a "wage" matter and, therefore,
may or may not invoke the Act's compulsory arbitration
provision.
(2)

Regulatory statutes such as the Utah Act do

not constitute tax measures.

The opinion of Justice Levin

in Dearborn Fire Fighters Union, Local No. 412, I.A.F.F. '
v. City of Dearborn, 231 N.W.2d 226 (Mich. 1975) (according to
plaintiffs' counsel "perhaps the best reasoned, researched
and written opinion of any case discovered by the writer,"
see plaintiffs' Brief at 17), notes that:
The City additionally contends that the
challenged Act "indirectly but undeniably,
surrenders the power to tax" in violation
of the following constitutional prohibition:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"The power of taxation shall never be surrendered,
suspended, or contracted away." [Citation omitted.]
The City premises that wage and benefit increases
for policemen and firemen can only be paid by the
imposition of new taxes. "Accordingly, the power
to grant such pay increases includes the power to
increase taxes." The orders of the arbitration
panels do not in terms require an increase in taxes.
Assuming the predicate of the City's argument,
that existing revenues are insufficient to fund
the cost of the increases in compensation and
benefits awarded, the orders can be read as contemplating either an increase in taxes or a decrease
in municipal expenditures. Be that as it may,
implicit in the power conferred by the Constitution on the Legislature to "resolve" disputes
concerning public employees is legislative power
to require, if need be, a public employer to
provide the necessary funds ... . The constitutional prohibition against surrender of the
power of taxation has not been violated. Id.
at 230.
The Washington Supreme Court has also noted that:
Spokane first relies upon [a constitutional provision] which states the Legislature has no power
to tax cities for municipal purposes. Spokane
contends that since [Washington's compulsory
arbitration law] will have the effect of imposing
additional expenses upon it in the form of increased
wages for uniformed personnel, the section violates
this constitutional provision. We cannot agree.
First, [Washington's compulsory arbitration law]
does not impose a tax. [Citation omitted.] "Taxes
are defined to be 'burdens or charges imposed
by a legislative authority on persons or property,
to raise money for public purposes, or more
briefly, an imposition for the supply of the
public treasury.'" [Washington's compulsory
arbitration law], although it may result in the
need for local taxation, does not itself impose any
"burden or charge." [Citation omitted.] In
addition, if the primary purpose of legislation
is regulation rather than raising revenue, the
legislation cannot be classified as a tax even if
a burden or charge is imposed. [Citation omitted.]
City of Spokane v. Spokane Police Guild, 553 P.2d
1316, 1318-1919 (Wash. 1976).
(The compulsory arbitration statutes in both Dearborn and
Spokane, unlike the Utah Act, provided for compulsory arbitration
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

relative to "wages" as well as other subjects of collective
bargaining.)
In short, plaintiffs1 argument that the Utah Act
will indirectly impose "taxation without representation"
on the residents of plaintiff municipalities fails to make
the obvious distinction between legislative power to regulate and legislative power to tax.
Defendants submit that the foregoing analysis
thoroughly discredits the statement of "facts" found in
plaintiffs' Brief.

Defendants further submit that the

judicial decision-making process is not well served by "fact"
statements representing one litigant's politicized version
of the economic wisdom of legislation under constitutional
attack.
ARGUMENT II
NEITHER FIREFIGHTER/CITY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
NOR COMPULSORY ARBITRATION OF FIREFIGHTER/CITY COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING DISPUTES CONSTITUTE MUNICIPAL FUNCTIONS AND,
THEREFORE, THE UTAH FIREFIGHTERS NEGOTIATIONS ACT DOES NOT
VIOLATE UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE VI § 28. 3
(1)

Plaintiffs have confused their Utah Consti-

tution, Article VI § 28 argument with other constitutional
arguments.

J

This Article VI § 28 issue will be hereinafter referred to
as the Article VI § 28 issue, the "home rule" issue, or the
municipal autonomy issue.
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The primary issue in the present case is whether
firefighter/city collective bargaining or compulsory arbitration of firefighter/city collective bargaining disputes
involve "municipal functions" within the meaning of Utah
Constitution, Article VI § 28.

See defendants1 Brief at 3.

However, plaintiffs1 Brief suggests that, because the Act
delegates legislative authority to a "politically unaccountable" arbitration board and because "adequate standards"
do not accompany this delegation, the Act violates Article VI
§ 28.

This interposition of "political accountability"

and "adequate standards" arguments relative to Article VI
§ 28's "municipal function" language is both inappropriate
and confusing.4

4

This same confusion has led plaintiffs to misapprehend and,
therefore, mischaracterize certain arguments in defendants1
Brief. For example, plaintiffs accuse defendants of misciting City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Association,
304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973). According to plaintiffs, the compulsory arbitration statute in Biddeford unconstitutionally
delegated State legislative power. See plaintiffs1 Brief
at 20 n.3. However, a unanimous, not a "badly divided,"
court in Biddeford ruled that compulsory arbitration of teacher/
school board disputes did not involve an unconstitutional
interference with local prerogatives. See ]Cd. at 388 ("All
justices concurring in Part I of opinion of Weatherbee J.").
This was obviously the point for which defendants cited the
Biddeford case. Similarly, plaintiffs accuse defendants of
misciting Dearborn Fire Fighters Union, Local No. 412,
I.A.F.F. v. City of Dearborn, 231 N.W.2d 226 (Mich. 1975).
See plaintiffs' Brief at 17. However, the Dearborn Court
unanimously upheld the Michigan compulsory arbitration statute
against "home rule" constitutional attack. See Id., at 226
("The Supreme Court held that ... the [compulsory arbitration]
statute does not unconstitutionally divest home rule cities
of their constitutional powers; and that the statute does
not surrender the power to tax to the arbitrators in violation
of the constitutional prohibition against the power of taxation
being 'surrendered, suspended, or contracted away 1 "). Since
by thefocused
Howard W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben Clark
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BYU.
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Article VI § 28 does not qualify its prohibition
against State interference in municipal affairs with any
"political accountability" or "adequate standards" rationale.
On the contrary, this prohibition is absolute:
The Legislature shall not delegate to any [not
just politically accountable] special commission
... any power [not just standardized power] to
... interfere with any municipal functions. (Emphasis
supplied.) Utah Constitution, Article VI § 28.
For example, plaintiffs would undoubtedly raise
Article VI § 28 objections to State interference with local
property taxation—whether such interference was made by
politically accountable or unaccountable agencies.
Similarly, plaintiffs1 "adequate standards" argument is based on plaintiffs' failure to distinguish between
Article VI § 28fs reference to State delegation of municipal
legislative power to special commissions and State delegation of State legislative power.5
Defendants admit that issues presented by Article VI
§ 28's "municipal function" language, "political accountability" and "adequate standards" are important issues, but
these issues should be dealt with separately.

Separate

"home rule" constitutional challenge, defendants are frankly
bewildered by plaintiffs' mischaracterization of defendants'
argument and by plaintiffs' failure to ascertain the correct
holding of cases such as Biddeford and Dearborn with respect
to the "home rule" issue.
5

Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint fails to allege an unconstitutional delegation of State legislative power and this
issue was not argued in the lower court. Plaintiffs are,
therefore, improperly raising this issue on appeal. See
defendants' Reply Brief, infra at Argument IV.
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treatment will add clarity to the debate over these issues and
will facilitate responsible redrafting of the Act in the event
the Act is found to be constitutionally deficient in any
particular respect.
(2)

Cases cited by plaintiffs in support of their

assertion that the Act violates Utah Constitution, Article VI
§ 2 8 are not compelling.
Defendants proceed to a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction
review of the "home rule" constitutional question as it
relates to firefighter/city collective bargaining and to
compulsory arbitration of firefighter/city collective bargaining disputes.

For convenience, defendants adopt the order

of jurisdictions used in plaintiffs1 Brief.
(a)

Washington.

Plaintiffs point to Washington

as a jurisdiction which disallows firefighter/city collective
bargaining and compulsory arbitration of firefighter/city
collective bargaining disputes.

Plaintiffs rely in this

regard on State v. Johnson, 278 P.2d 662 (Wash. 1955).
plaintiffs' Brief at 10-12.

See

Defendants have already dis-

tinguished the Johnson case on two grounds:

(1)

Whereas

Utah Constitution, Article VI § 28 proscribes only State
interference in municipal affairs, Johnson involved a
municipality's amendment of its own charter to allow compulsory arbitration of firefighter/city collective bargaining
disputes; and (2) the charter amendment in Johnson was ruled
invalid because the State had not granted the municipality
power to make such an amendment.

In other words, a munici-
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or withheld by the State of Washington as a matter of State
and not municipal policy.

See defendants' Brief at 24-25.

Defendants' analysis of Johnson has been vindicated
in the recent case of City of Spokane v. Spokane Police
Guild, 553 P.2d 1316 (Wash. 1976).

There, the City of Spokane

challenged State legislation requiring Washington cities
to submit unresolved collective bargaining disputes between
firefighters, policemen, and cities to arbitration.

Spokane

argued that this legislation "taxed" plaintiff municipalities
for "municipal purposes" in violation of the Washington
State Constitution.

The Washington Supreme Court rejected

this argument on the ground that compulsory arbitration of
firefighter/city collective bargaining disputes does not
involve a "municipal purpose."
If the legislative purpose is "to obtain performance of the duties promoting the general welfare
and security of the State," the constitutional
prohibition is inapplicable [citations omitted].
It is readily apparent that strikes by police and
firefighters for any reason, which place public
health and safety in immediate danger, are a matter
which concerns the State at large and not merely
a particular municipality [citation omitted].
Such a strike in Spokane might, for example, necessitate the use of the State militia or State Patrol
to do the police work, or the use of firefighters
from neighboring areas to put out fires in Spokane
[citation omitted] ... . "The preservation of
the public peace and the like, although confided
to local agencies, are essentially matters of public
concern ... ." Id., at 1319.
Turning to the question of Johnson's status as
precedent relative to the compulsory arbitration issue,
the Court stated flatly that Johnson:
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... is not controlling. [Johnson] held an
amendment to the Everett City charter, providing for arbitration of disputes between the
firemen and the city, to be an unlawful delegation
to the arbitrators of the authority vested ...
[citation omitted] in the mayor and city council
to fix wages of municipal employees. [Johnson],
however, was decided prior to the enactment in
1973 of the Public Employees' Collective Bargaining
Act [citation omitted], the constitutionality of
ivhich we uphold. The legislation in that Act not
only made such a delegation lawful and mandatory
by enactment of this law, but provided ... [citation omitted] that the provisions of the Act
"shall control" in case of conflict with "any other
statute, ordinance, rule or regulation of any
public employer as it relates to uniformed
employees ... ." The conflict presented in
[Johnson] has, therefore, been eliminated ...
[citation omitted], and what was held unlawful
in that case is now both lawful and mandatory.
Id. at 1320.
See also, City of Everett v. Fire Fighters, Local No. 350
of the International Association of Fire Fighters, 555 P.2d
418 (Wash. 1976).
Defendants submit that the State of Washington,
by virtue of its Spokane decision, is following the majority
of jurisdictions in upholding firefighter/city collective
bargaining and compulsory arbitration of firefighter/city
collective bargaining disputes against "home rule" constitutional attacks.
(b)

California.

Defendants rely on Professional

Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 384 P.2d 153
(Cal. 1963) as support for the proposition that firefighter/
city collective bargaining does not violate constitutional
provisions concerned with municipal autonomy.
Brief at 10-11.

See defendants1

Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Professional

Fire Fighters on three grounds.
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First, plaintiffs suggest that "the case has no
relevance to the case before the Bar, because Salt Lake City
is not a charter city."

See plaintiffs' Brief at 20 n.3.

Defendants are intrigued by plaintiffs' charter
city/non-charter city distinction.

If all cases involving

charter cities are irrelevant to the present case, then most
of the major cases relied on by plaintiffs, e.g., Greeley
Police Union v. City Council of Greeley, 553 P.2d 790 (Colo.
1976), State v. Johnson, 278 P.2d 662 (Wash. 1955), and City
of Beaverton v. International Association of Fire Fighters,
Local 1660, Beaverton Shop, 531 P.2d 730 (Ore. Ct. App.
1975), must be judged irrelevant by plaintiffs' own standard.
Even the case which plaintiffs cite as controlling in California on the "home rule" constitutional issue with respect
to compulsory arbitration of firefighter/city collective
bargaining disputes, San Francisco Firefighters Local 798,
I.A.F.F., AFL-CIO v. City and County of San Francisco, 129
Cal. Rptr. 39 (Cal Ct. App. 1976) , involves a charter city.
The short answer to plaintiffs' charter city/noncharter city argument is simply that nothing in the language
of Utah Constitution, Article VI § 28 distinguishes between
chartered and non-chartered cities:

"The Legislature shall

not [interfere with] ... any municipal improvement, money,
property, or effects ... or ... perform any municipal function."
(Emphasis supplied.)

Defendants, therefore, conclude that

plaintiffs' charter/non-charter city argument makes a distinction without making a difference.
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P1 a 2 nt i f f s ' s e c o nd • j r o tin d f :i) r :! i s t I n g u i s h i n g Professional Fire Fighters is t h a t :

ff

This case did n o t

involve binding a r b i t r a t i o n ; r a t h e r , this case involved
the charge of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , that i s , t h e right to join o r
refrain from joining a labor organization
prjj^r/.v

The issues

.-. •- .-.. Ii i i i i) ;vay similar " Plaintiffs f Brief

at 20
P ] a i n tiffs adm i t that Pr o fe ss ion a 1 Fire Fi ghters
did n o t involve a compulsory arbitra tion Issue and that it
did involve pablic employer discrimination against public
employee attempts to or gai lize for col lective bargainii lg
purposes.

H o w e v e r , it does not follow from these admissions

that Professiona 1 Fi re Fighters is "i n i i ID tta] r si m i l a r " t o the
present case.

On the contrary, Professional Fire Fighters

held that a firefighter/city collective b a r g a i n i n g law d i d
n o t v i o 1 a t e C a 1 i f o r n i a f s f' 1 i o n > e r u 1 e '"f c o n s t i t u t ion a 1 p r o v I sion.

This p r o v i s i o n is v i r t u a l l y i d e n t i c a l t o U t a h C o n s t i -

t u t i o n , Article V I § 28.

S e e Cali fornia C o n s t i t u t i o n ,

Article XI § 1 3 .
A f t e r n o t m a rr. it ~ matter of "'State-wide c o n c e r n "
does no t ii I • ^ol\ • .

x_ -..

unctioi i, : tl le Court stated that:

Because the various sections of Article XI fail
to define municipal affairs, it becomes necessary
for the courts to decide, under the facts of each
casef whether the subject matter under discussion
is of municipal or State-wide concern. This
question must be determined from the legislative
purpose in each instance. In the instant case
it would appear that the Legislature was attempting
to deal with labor relations on a State-wide
basis ..• . The total effect of all this legis•lation was not to deprive local government
. of
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the right to manage and control its fire departments , but to create uniform fair labor practices
throughout the State. As such, the legislation may
impinge upon local control to a limited extentf
but it is nonetheless a matter of State concern.
Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los
Angeles, 384' P.2d 158, 169 (Cal. 1963).
This Court has employed almost identical reasoning to define the municipal function language of Article VI
§ 28.

See Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., 540 P.2d 499, 503

(Utah 1975).

This consonance of reasoning in Professional

Fire Fighters and Tribe compel a finding that at least the
collective bargaining provisions of the Utah Act do not
violate Article VI § 28.
Finally, plaintiffs suggest that the case of
San Francisco Firefighters Local 798, I.A.F.F., AFL-CIO v.
City and County of San Francisco, 129 Cal. Rptr. 39 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1976), provides an accurate statement of California's
"home rule" law with respect to compulsory arbitration of
firefighter/city collective bargaining disputes.

However,

defendants are at a loss to see the bearing which San Francisco
has on the present case.
First, compulsory arbitration in San Francisco
was mandated by a contract or "memorandum agreement" between
local firefighter unions and city officials—not by State
legislative fiat.

It is, therefore, difficult to see how

Article VI § 28's proscription of State legislative interference would apply to the San Francisco situation.

Second,

the San Francisco Court struck down the firefighter/city
compulsory arbitration agreement because that agreement
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contradicted the San Francisco »:ity cl^irtei .

This dilute!.

" f represents the supreme law 1 of the city subject only to
conflicting constitutional provisions
State law. f "

(Emphasis supplied.)

l

an< I to pre-emptive

Id. at 44.

"Pre-emptive

State Ia-*i7 relative to compulsory arbitration of firefighter/
city -rv. ;--*-£'v'-

a^caininq

disputes was absent in San Francisco

because California law provides that firefighter/city
arbitration agreements
and 46.

"shall not 1 )e bi nding."

compulsory

Ici. at 41

This theme of State predominance in the area of

firefighter/city labor relations is underscored

throughout

the Court * .: vji:ixcn i
"[Tjhe principle is fundamental and of universal
application that public powers conferred upon a
municipal corporation and its officers and agents
cannot be delegated to others, unless so authorized
by the Legislature or charter."
(Emphasis supplied.)
[Quoting from 2 McQuillin, The Law of Municipal
Corporations § 10.39 (3rd ed. 1966).]
... "As a
general rule, powers conferred upon public agencies
and officers which involve the exercise of judgment or discretion are in the nature of public
trusts and cannot be surrendered or delegated to
subordinates in the absence of statutory authorization. "
(Emphasis in original.)
[Quoting iirom
California School Employees Association v. Personnel
Commission, 474 P.2d 436, 439 (Cal. 1975).]
San
Francisco Firefighters Local 798, I.A.F.F., AFLCIO v. City of San Francisco, 129 Cal. Rptr. 39,
43 (Cal, Ct. App. 1 9 7 6 ) .
See also, Huntington Beach Police Officers' > Association

v.

City of Huntington Beach , 129 Ca 1. Rptr. ' •* 3 , !3 n 3 (Cal. C t.
App. 1976)

("With respect to matters of State-wide concern,

charter cities arn

subject ft :i!*i<"< r ::

^iit-M by

applicable

general State law if the Legislature has manifested an intent
to occupy the field to the exclusion of 1 ocal regulati c n
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[Citations omitted*]

Labor relations in the public sector

are matters of State-wide concern subject to State legislation in contravention of local regulation by chartered cities
[citing Professional Fire Fighters./ Inc. v. City of Los
Angeles, 384 P.2d 158 (Cal. 1963) ]M).-.
Plaintiffs cannot seriously maintain that either
the holding or language of San Francisco supports their
position in the present case.

If anything, the Court's

constant reference to "pre-emptive State law" in the firefighter/city labor relations field intimates support for
defendants1 argument that compulsory arbitration of firefighter/city collective bargaining disputes is a matter of
State-wide and not merely local concern and, therefore,
does not violate Article VI § 28.
(c)

Oregon.

Plaintiffs' Brief at 14 incorrectly

states that an Oregon Court of Appeals decision "struck down"
the Oregon statute authorizing compulsory arbitration of
firefighter/city collective bargaining disputes on "home
rule" constitutional grounds.

See City of Beaverton v.

International Association of Firefighters, Local 1660,
Beaverton Shop, 531 P.2d 730 (Ore. Ct. App. 1975).

Defendants

concede that the Beaverton Court used language broad enough
to declare the arbitration statute unconstitutional.

However,

Beaverton1s actual holding was as follows:
Clearly the 1973 labor relations legislation
deals with many matters which are predominantly
of local concern. It may also, although we need
not make that determination here, deal with matters
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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which under [State ex rel. Eeinig v. City of
Milwaukie, 373 P.2d 680 (Ore. 1962)] are predominantly matters of State concern. ... This
holding does not prevent PERB from examining the
[municipal] ordinance section by section under
the powers granted to it by [the 1973 labor relations
legislation] and holding invalid those provisions,
if any, which purport to govern matters of predominantly State-wide concern and which are in conflict with the provisions of the 1973 Act. Id., at
736-737.
The iriccnclu:?iT^ nature M ! Btjuvoiton ' s holding ' .us
emphasized fay the Washington Supreme Court in City of Everett
v. Firefighters, Local No. 350 of the International Association of Firefighters, 555 P.2d 418 (Wash. 1976):
The only remaining authority cited [City of
Beaverton v. International Association of Firefighters , Local 1660, Beaverton Shop, 531 P.2d
730 (Ore. Ct. App. 1975)] is not helpful to the
city. The Court there held that the fact that
a city ordinance dealt with matters which were
covered by a State statute governing labor relations
(and providing for compulsory arbitration) iid not
render it totally invalid. Rather, the Court
decided the ordinance should be upheld to the extent
that it dealt with matters of purely local concern.
which were not covered by the State law, Ld. at 4J",
Not only does Beaverton1s remand to the Oregon
Public rJrr.^cyment Relations Board dilute Beaverton1 s impact,
but also Beaverton's rationale would support a ruling favorable to defendants in the present: erase, Thi is , the Beaverton
Court noted that:
". . . [the] legislative assembly does not have
the authority to enact a law relating to city
government ... unless the subject matter of the
enactment is of general concern to the State as
a whole, that is to say that it is a matter of more
than local concern to each of the municipalities
purported to be regulated by the enactment."
City of Beaverton v. International Association
of Firefighters; Local 1660, Beaverton Shop, 531
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-21-

P.2d 730, 734 (Ore. Ct. App. 1975) quoting from
State ex rel. Heinig v. City of Milwaukie/ 373
P.2d 680, 683 (Ore. 1962).
*
This reasoning is similar to this Court's definition
of Article VI § 28* s municipal function language in Tribe v.
Salt Lake City Corp. , 540 P.2d 499', 503 (Utah 1975).

If a

localized phenomenon such as the "urban blight" involved in
Tribe can be a matter of State-wide concern, then certainly
firefighter/city labor relations is a matter of State-wide
concern also.

The Beaverton opinion seemingly acknowledges

this fact when it notes that:

"The preservation of order,

the enforcement of law, the protection of life and property,
and the suppression of crime are attributes of State sovereignty
and matters of State-wide concern ... ."

City of Beaverton v.

International Association of Firefighters, Local 1660,
Beaverton Shop, 531 P.2d 730, 736 (Ore. Ct. App. 1975).
Beaverton's failure to carry this premise to its
logical conclusion, i.e., that firefighter/city labor relations
matters affect the "preservation of order" and the "protection
of life and property" and are, therefore, matters of Statewide concern, is the result of two unfortunate Oregon Supreme
Court decisions.

See State ex rel. Heinig v. City of Milwaukie,

373 P.2d 680 (Ore. 1962) (ruling State statute establishing
civil service commission for city firemen unconstitutional
on "home rule" grounds) and Branch v. Albee, 142 P. 598 (Ore.
1914) (declaring State pension plan for city policemen
unconstitutional on "home rule" grounds).
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' • •• Defendants are confi dent that, i n 1 ight of the
Tribe opinion, this Court woul d not follow authorities such '•
a s He in.i a1 o r Branch wi th 11 1 ei r :::oncoi ni tan11 y unreal i s tic
affect.

See defendants 1 Brief at 2 8-30.
(d)

Colorado • P1 ai nt I f fs :::i te 11: ie case of Greeley

Police Union v. City Council of Greeley, 5 33 P.2d 79 0 (Colo,
1976) in support of their assertion that compulsory arbitrat ion of f ire f i ghte r / c i ty co11ec tive bargaining disputes
violates "home rule'1 constitutional provisions.
tiffs 1 Brief at 3 6-1 1

See plain-

The Greeley opinion does all/ode I: .c a

"home rule'1' constitutional provision similar to Utah Constitution, Article VI § 28.

See Greelev Police Union v, "i ^

Council of Greeley , 5 j 3 P. Jcf ? 9 ) , 7 ? 2 {Co 1 o . 19 76).

This

provision, like Article VI § 28, proscribes State legislative inte r*<•*renc f- i n ;niin ici\'a 1 af f ai r'». , "I\i)we vei , ±n Greeley
the city amended its own charter to allow compulsory arbitration oc

^irefighter/cit^ collective bargair--; -•!--'r;pf,
. r*3 is r.\ 7tate legislation

•-t- __.-

concerning the rights cf

im

Colorado]

public employees ~c enoage :. r coilec- • * •.. " •..• c n a z L L U L ^ Ox L Q . y i >..; v i. -

cive bare'-;":*' .

^ions are ir.applicdjle to the; Greeley situation.

This in-

applicability c:ir N- : I I»^+-*-2te-l h^ contrasting plaintiffs'
ar;ur.tc. •
Greeley,

';. -r ^.*TCM.

I—•

;:;.

the c:*

Plaintiffs here can invoke Article

' - arguments in
T;J

I s 28 by

showing that compulsory dr-hf:ratio!! n+ f.--- f. t.it^r 'ci ty
collective bargaining disputes is a .matter of local and not
State-wide concern.

See Tribe v. Salt Lake. City Corp., 54 0
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P.2d 499, 503 (Utah 1975).

However, the city in Greeley

argued "that the charter amendment [authorizing compulsory
arbitration of firefighter/city collective bargaining disputes]
involves a matter of State-wide concern which is not properly
subject to municipal regulation."

Greeley Police Union v.

City Council of Greeley, 533 P.2d 790# 791 (Colo. 1976).
In other words, the city in Greeley was suggesting that it
lacked authority from the State Legislature to regulate firefighter/city labor relations and absent such authority it
could not usurp what was otherwise a State legislative
preogative.

See defendants' Brief at 6-9 and Allgood v. Larson,

545 P.2d 530, 531-532 (Utah 1976).
this argument, noting that:

The Greeley Court rejected

"The city may legislate on such

matters in the absence of conflicting statutory provisions."
(Emphasis supplied.)

Greeley Police Union v. City Council of

Greeley, 553 P.2d 790/ 791 (Colo. 1976).

This statement

obviously implies that, if the Colorado State Legislature did
enact firefighter/city labor relations legislation, such
legislation would prevail over conflicting local practice.
This implication is reinforced by Chief Justice Pringle's
dissent:

"In my view, it is a matter of local concern as

to how a home rule city will determine its wages for policemen."

Id. at 793.

Chief Justice Pringle's dissent would be

anomalous if the majority opinion in Greeley had held that
firefighter/city labor relations involve "municipal functions,"
as defined in Tribe, and are, therefore, not subject to State
regulation.6

Defendants, therefore, conclude that plaintiffs'
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i-' -,^ <•

^3* lz..*-l.

^e'-l--"

.- -

. - Greeley

rationale is ::. diametric opposit -:~i *c ~ e ocsitior; olairtiffs must take re-3t-- • -~
case.
to
is

~* —

^

- •-: . r --.:. -

Once again > ,aintiffs have looked -nly

. C:urt'.r

superficially

:c;~clusior. :" jt a con-».r -^*--* arbitration st^~;rte

. r.-. , : .- . r.a

^ .. . h^v^ over- *c/^3 - u ° Court's reason for

arriving at that conclusion.''
{ P i v i ch i gan ,

P! a i nt i f f;: *' Hr i e :" i l

J ' -ire u • eb

defendants of misciting Dearborn Fire Fighters Union, Local
No. 4 1 2 , I.A.F.F. v. City of Dearborn, 2 31
19 7 5) "as

J.W.IM 2?n

(Mich.

ijthority for tne proposition that binding and

compulsory arbitration has been upheld
defendant'- ilji.l not r:A

n

,

the Dearborn case

^a/eve:,
' • .r the proposi-

tion that binding and compulsory arbitration has been
upheld

... . "

The context of defendants 1

b

ir

—

-. --:-} ;v

Plaintiffs' Brief at 17 n.2 unwittingly accepts defendants 1
argument in this regard.
Plaintiffs observe that Greeley
"cites Huff [v. Mayor and City Council of Colorado Springs,
512 P.2d 632 (Colo. 1973)] and notes no conflict between it
and its 1976 decision." This absence of conflict is
attributable to Huff's and Greeley's acceptance of defendants'
argument in the present case that firefighter/city labor
relations do not involve "municipal functions," as that term
is interpreted in Tribe, within the meaning of Article VI
§ 2 8 . "While we do not conclude that the city of Colorado
Springs has no interest in pension plans for city firemen,
we do not hesitate to characterize firemen's pensions as being
of State-wide concern as well. We begin by recognizing that
the protection of property generally, of which fire protection is an obvious example, is of basic and fundamental
importance to all citizens of the State and the general public
has a vital interest in the quality and reliability of that
protection,
[Citations omitted.] Colorado Springs itself
recognizes that adequate fire protection is not solely of
local concern when it enters mutual assistance agreements
with areas outside its city limits to provide fire protection
services. 11 Digitized
Id.by at
634,
See
alsoJ. Reuben
defendants'
Brief at 16.
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reveals that Dearborn was cited for the proposition that
firefighter/city collective bargaining and compulsory arbitration of firefighter/city collective bargaining disputes
are not "municipal functions" and, therefore, do not violate
"home rule" constitutional provisions.

While split on other

issues, the Dearborn Court unanimously supports defendants'
Article VI § 28 argument.

See Id. at 226 ("The Supreme Court

held that ... the compulsory arbitration statute does not
unconstitutionally divest home rule cities of their constitutional powers; and that the statute does not surrender the
power to tax to the arbitrators in violation of the constitutional prohibition against the power of taxation being
'surrendered, suspended, or contracted away.'"). See also,
Pontiac Police Officers Association v. City of Pontiac, 246

'The Greeley opinion also supports defendants' contention
that the collective bargaining and compulsory arbitration
provisions of the Utah Act are severable. See Greeley
Police Union v. City Council of Greeley, 553 P.2d 790,
792-793 (Colo. 1976). The Court recognized that collective
bargaining and compulsory arbitration involve functionally
dissimilar processes. Thus, in a companion case to Greeley,
the Court contrasts these processes: "The defect in the
board's position that the subject [collective bargaining] agree
ment constitutes an unlawful delegation of authority and
places control of a school system in the hands of an employee
organization reflects a basic misperception of the negotiations process. Negotiations between an employer and an
employee organization entered into voluntarily ... do not
require the employer to agree with the proposals submitted
by employees. Rather, the ultimate decisions regarding
employment terms and conditions remain exclusively with
the board. While the employees' influence is permitted
and felt, the control of decision-making has not been abrogated or delegated." (Emphasis in original.) Littleton
Education Association v. Arapahoe County School District,
553 P.2d 793, 796 (Colo. 1976).
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N.W,2d 833 (Mi ch. 1976) (city's State-imposed duty t o
b a r g a i n c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h r e s p e c t to p o l i c e - c i t y g r i e v a n c e
p r o c e d u r e s does n o t frustrate c i t y ' s e x e r c i s e o f i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l "home rule 1 " powers) .
Even p l a i n t i f f s 1 s u g g e s t i o n t h a t compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n o f f I r e f i g 1 I t e r, ' c i t y c o 1 1 e c t i ; e b a i: g a i n i n g d i s p u t e s
w a s held to b e p e r se u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o n o t h e r g r o u n d s in
Dearborn stretches t h e truth.
r.

.-

T.

ir„„

See D e a r b o r n Fire Fiahters

„

.

-

|

I,

- '

• •

I

Illli

, .«„—*„,:

•- .

U n i o n , Local N o . 412 I.A.F.F. v. City of Dearborn, 231
N.W.2d 2 2 6 , 243 (Mich, :*>-'*
opinion)

("I hav^

i-: -:

\

\ /avanagh, concurring

_-....•- ,--.

-

.

.-HC .se I

am satisfied that he has correctly stated the law,
separately r to emphasize the observation he m a k e s .

" write
A L least

as long as the law prohibiting public employees from striking
is maintained, some form of compulsory arbitration is a
c o n s t i t u t i o i I a 1 1 y p e rin i s s i b 1 e d e v i c e t :> p r o v i d e £ o r t h e
settlement of disputes between such employees and their
employers. ").
Unfortunately, plaintiffs 1 confusion with respect
to

i .

D^a^korr. T s d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e "home rule 11 issue h a s resulted
.-•:..: . • '::

. : i_ ;..rehensioi i of defend,' a,i its f Artie3 e ^;rT § 28

argument,
'-'

Massachusetts.

T h e r e c e n t case o f Town of

A r l i n g t o n v , Board o f C o n c i l i a t i o n a n d A r b i t r a t i o n , 352
N•E•2d 9 3 4 (Mass. 19 76) further supports d e f e n d a n t s f contenti DTi that fire fig! iter '"ci tv col lecti ve bargaining and compu 1 sory
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arbitration of firefighter/city collective bargaining disputes
does not violate "home rule" constitutional provisions.
In Arlington/ plaintiff municipalities sought a
declaratory judgment that the compulsory arbitration statute
governing firefighter/city collective bargaining disputes
in Massachusetts was unconstitutional.

The Massachusetts

Supreme Court framed the issue for decision as follows:
"Does the Act, in providing for binding arbitration for
policemen and firefighters, violate the Home Rule Amendment
to the Massachusetts Constitution in that it removes all
decision-making power with regard to those services from the
municipality?"

Id. at 916.

Answering this question in the negative, the Court
stated:
[The Home Rule] amendment, while providing the
broad grant of governmental powers referred to
above, limits the municipal exercise of those
powers to acts which are "not inconsistent with the
Constitution or laws enacted by the General Court
[State Legislature] in conformity with powers
reserved to the General Court ... . The General
Court shall have the power to act in relation to
cities and towns ... by general laws ... ." It
is no longer subject to debate that the General
Court has the power to legislate in the area of
municipal wages and benefits .... We have made it
plain ... [citations omitted] that in case of
inconsistency or conflict a local ordinance or
bylaw must give way as in these cases where a
general law has been enacted by the General
Court ... . ^d. at 918.
Thus Massachusetts has entered that column of
jurisdictions which have upheld statutes similar to the Utah
Act against "home rule" constitutional challenges.

See also,

defendants1 Brief at 6-9 and Allgood v. Larson, 545 P.2d 530,
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j

."<

(3)
?cn^r-r

-

Conclusion,
>-l\c-

Since the declarations of TJcah

outlined in d e f e n d a n t s 1 Brief at 4-6

and "he Tribe rationale are essentially di spositive of the
"home rule" i s s u e , defendants suspect th^t case Lav ;-n c m s
i ..:*•; "

issue from, other jurisdictions I las 1 i mit-present case.

N e v e r t h e l e s s , i in should be noted that ~::e

vast majori ty of j i Iri sdi cti ons has upheId either firefighter/
city collective bargaining or compulsory arbitration of
firefighter/city collective bargaining disputes against
" home rule 11 const i t u t i o n a 1 a 11 a c k s . De f e n da n t s r e s p e c t f u 11 y
submit t h a t the following states can be included w i t h i n this
c a t e go ry :

'• ' • - I i a (co 1 1 ect i ve b ar ga i n i n g ) ; Ma i ne

b a r g a i n i n g anc conoulsory a r b i t r a t i o n ) ; M a s s a c h u s e t t s
b a r g a i n i n g and conoulsory arbi tration) ; M i c h i g a n

(collective

(collective

(collective

b a r g a i n i n g and coripuisory arbitration) ; New York (col 1 ect I'!= "e
b a r g a i n i n g and cor?*;ulsory arbitration) ; Oklahoma

(collective

b a r g a i n i n g) ; Rh o d e I s 1 a n d (c o 1 1 e c t i v e b a r g a i n I n g a n d c o :mp n 3 s o r y
arbitration;- W a s h i n g t o n

(collective bargaining and compulsory

arbitration) ; and Wyomhn;: (collective bargaining and compulsory
arbitration).
Other s t a t e s , ?uch as Colorado, have struck
c :-v-.:ul "^ ~

r: ; —

:

* -.* -i-*-)^ - • - :-

re the Article VI i _ £* .ssua: n\c

:

^

dc^r*

grounds r e l e v a n t

Oregon'- appellate court

d e c i s i o n _s by no n.eans the final o ; d e r n i t i v e v o r ; ;r. Oregon's
c o m p u l s o r y arbitration :-;-.„::;_-_.,

\:

-v~_ \ :
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South Dakota and Pennsylvania, have invalidated compulsory
arbitration statutes for municipal autonomy reasons*

The

Pennsylvania court's deicision on the municipal autonomy
issue was clearly dictum and the South Dakota court does
not provide a reasoned resolution of the compulsory arbitration problem.

These circumstances have prompted the

following remark from a Utah labor relations expert:
The sovereignty argument, as it developed in
the United States, begins with the propositions
that government has sole authority over all
governmental functions and that such authority
cannot be delegated to, usurped by, or shared
with any other party. Thus, bargaining with,
or striking against, government is per se
illegal because such activity challenges the
sovereign's exclusive right to prescribe the
conditions under which public servants work.
The sovereignty argument would require that
governmental officials unilaterally establish
public employment conditions. Similarly, the
"illegal delegation of powers" argument provides
that statutory authority exclusively grant
governmental powers to government. Since the
government is both possessor and guardian of
governmental power, any delegation of such
power to another party is a violation of
statutory authority. Therefore, since collective bargaining contemplates some sharing of
authority, government participation in negotiations is per se illegal. Although the doctrines
of sovereignty and illegal delegation of powers
were once major factors in delaying collective
bargaining in public employment, both doctrines
have since been generally discredited by legal
scholars and totally rejected by the courts.
E. G. Gee, "Organizing the Halls of Ivy: Developing
a Framework for Viable Alternatives in Higher
Education Employment," 1973 Utah L. Rev. 233,
235.
Defendants submit that Article VI § 28 and its
proscription against State delegation of municipal functions
to special commissions does not apply to the Utah Act.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT III
THE UTAH FFRKF1GHTERS NEGOTIATIONS ACT IS NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY GROUNDS.
Plaintiffs argue vehemently that compulsory arbitration i s "incompatible v: • • • ..-_ . .:-sentative governmer; t * M
from L. Bernstei n.

: • . ; ---.T ,

See plaintiffs 1 Brief :• .•'

•-*:••'•--•

-

*

• --'.*

tv .-=•

y:otinc

s

-^

Labor Relations/ 1 'c5 Harv. L. Rev, 45S, ;e7 (19 71: . *
Defendants concede that uhio argument :*as great
emotional appeal,

However, the democratic or ur:^-;-. -r

character -;f I.IP L:ar ?.c: v.as practically no significance
in terms

- -.-

constitutionality.

Thus, the Ma ssa-

chusetts Supreme Court has stated:

6

In support of this argument, plaintiffs cite Greeley Police
Union v, City Council of Greeley, 553 P.2d 790 (Colo, 1976)
anc
^ Dearborn Fire Fighters Union, Local No, 412, I.A.F.F. v.
City of Dearborn, 231 N.W.2d 226 (Mich. 1975), Greeley's"holding
on this point is based on a unique Colorado constitutional
provision. See Greeley Police Union v. City Council of
Greeley, 553 P.2d 790, 792 (Colo, 1976) and Colorado Constitution, Article XXI § 4. Aside from this fact, Greeley 1 s professed commitment to the tenets of political democracy is at
best paradoxical and at worst patently hypocritical: in the
name of "democracy" the Greeley Court struck down a city charter
amendment which had been approved by the Greeley city electorate as an initiative measure. The plurality opinion in Dearborn •
did not declare the Michigan compulsory arbitration statute
unconstitutional on "political accountability" grounds. On the
contrary, both Justice Levin and Chief Justice Kavanagh indicated
that compulsory arbitration "is a constitutionally permissible
device to provide for the settlement of disputes between ...
employees and their employers." Dearborn Fire Fighters Union,
Local No. 412, I.A.F.F. v. City of Dearborn, 231 N.W.2d 226,
243 (Mich. 1975) (C. J. Kavanagh, concurring opinion). Justice
Levin and Chief Justice Kavanagh quarreled with the Michigan
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The town devotes much of its Brief to what
is essentially a challenge to the wisdom of
the policy decisions made by the Legislature
in enacting [the compulsory arbitration law].
We are referred to what is apparently a not
insignificant collection of literature by
scholars in the field of- labor relations
critical of binding arbitration as a device
for settling collective bargaining disputes,
especially those in the public sector.
Furthermore, the town vigorously argues that
this particular scheme, in that it imposes a
decision of "politically unaccountable"
arbitrators against the wishes of popularly
elected local government officials, is not
consonant with the proper "exercise of political
power in a representative democracy." While we
do not question the respectability of the
political philosophy articulated or the apparent
sincerity with which it is expressed, the town
fails to give this argument constitutional
content. Particular political, social and
economic beliefs, no matter how fervantly
espoused, are not translated into constitutional
imperatives without reference to specific
constitutional provisions. In this opinion
we have considered the specific constitutional
challenges advanced by the town and found them
insufficient to render the Act invalid. The
further public policy arguments are of a "type ...
regularly and properly resolved in the political
arbitration statute because its arbitration board was composed
on an ad hoc rather than continuous basis. Thus Justice Coleman
noted that: "The most ardent objection is made to the [arbitration] panel's tenure of office. Somehow a relatively short
tenure is said to equal political irresponsibility. Although
the Legislature could have established another bureaucracy,
it chose short term panels to meet impasses immediately—no matter
how many or where they might occur simultaneously. The duties
do not require office work outside of the immediate arbitration activity, so a permanent staff could easily prove costly
and unnecessary or inadequate. (There could be many or no impasses
within a given span of time.) The Legislature also could have
believed bias and corruption less likely to settle into these
panels." Id. at 249 (Opinion of J. Coleman). Defendants agree
with Justice Coleman that an arbitration board's tenure has little
or no meaning in terms of the board's "political accountability";
and, indeed, the Utah Legislature could have found that tenured
arbitration boards, like most other bureaucratic institutions,
become entrenched and insensitive to the public needs they are
by the Howard
Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
originally Digitized
designed
toW. Hunter
serve.
'
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and legislative arenas." [Citation omitted.]
•„. The cities and towns of the commonwealth
do not represent a small, inarticulate or
unsophisiticated group unable to present their
positions to the General Court [State Legislature].
We suggest that the proper forum for the policy
arguments pressed on us here is in the Legislature as it decides whether the binding arbitration
procedures of the Act with respect to police and
firefighter collective bargaining disputes should
be continued and, if so, whether any modification
should be made. Town of Arlington v. Board of
Conciliation and Arbitration, 352 N.E.2d 9] 4,
921 and 922 (Mass. 1976).
The Utah Constitution, rv^t \ lair-tiffs1 peculiar
notions about

. t;

i

.

.

. -

-

V--.-

--1--

the ultimate expression of ropular vi I - ~. V~a...

" reflects
That Con-

stitution rrov. •>--- -nac:
The Legislature may, by appropriate legislation
... provide for the comfort, safety, and general
welfare of any and all employees. Mo provision
of this Constitution shall be construed as a
limitation upon the authority of the Legislature
to confer upon any commission now or hereafter
created such power and authority as the Legislature may deem requisite to carry out the provisions of this section. Utah Constitution,
Article XVI § 8.
See ,. *

.-...--. .-ir -

r: ^

The ir^ah Oonstituticn also stands for the proposition that:
Our [Utah] Legislature is directly representative
of the people of the sovereign state, and thus
has inherently all of the powers of government
except as otherwise specified by the State Constitution. By way of comparison, it is significantly different in that respect from the Federal
government, which is a government of limited
powers that can properly do only those things within
the scope of the powers expressly granted to it by
the States through the Federal Constitution; whereas,
the State Legislature, having the residuum of governmental power, does not look to the State Consti• tution for the grant of its powers, but that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Constitution only sets forth the limitations on its
authority. Therefore, it can do any act or perform
any function of government not specifically prohibited by the State Constitution* Wood v. Budge,
374 P.2d 516, 518 (Utah 1962).
See also, Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc.,
446 P.2d 958, 962 (Utah 1968) ("The Legislature of the State,
which represents the people and thus the sovereign, has all
of the residuum of power of government, except only as
expressly restricted by the Constitution.") and Great Salt
Lake Authority v. Island Ranching Co., 414 P.2d 963, 966
(Utah 1966) ("...

there is undoubtedly plenty of room within

the limits of constitutional power for legislation which may
be considered by some as ill-advised, improvident or unwise.
But the Legislature is the voice of the people who hold the
plenary power of government except as limited by the Consituation") .
In light of these fundamental principles of constitutional law in Utah, it is not enough for plaintiffs to
speculate that the Act may be "undemocratic" in character
and, therefore, unconstitutional.

The Act's "alleged violation

of the Constitution must be of a specific provision of a
particular article thereof."

Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug

Centers, Inc., 446 P.2d 958, 961 (Utah 1968).

Moreover, the

Act "must clearly violate some constitutional provision, and
further, the violation must be clear, complete and unmistakable. " Id.
Plaintiffs have not and cannot make this showing
with respect to their "political democracy" argument because
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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*

the people of Utah have already spoken—through Utah Constitution , Article XVI § 8 and through the fundamental constitutional principle of legislative supremacy—that firefighter/
city labor relations are to be regulated by the State Legislature.

Indeed, plaintiffs demonstrate their lack of commit-

ment to democratic principles when they insist that the fraction of Utah's populace represented by plaintiff municipalities should dictate this labor relations policy for the majority
of Utah residents who are dependent upon plaintiff municipalities for the preservation of property, peace, and order
through fire protection in the State.
ARGUMENT IV
PLAINTIFFS1 CLAIM THAT THE UTAH FIREFIGHTERS
NEGOTIATIONS ACT'S DELEGATION OF STATE LEGISLATIVE POWER IS
WITHOUT ADEQUATE STANDARDS AND IS, THEREFORE, UNCONSTITUTIONAL
WAS NEITHER PLED NOR ARGUED IN THE LOWER COURT AND IS, THEREFORE, IMPROPERLY RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
Plaintiffs' Brief at 32-35 argues that the Act's
delegation of State legislative power to an arbitration
board is without "adequate standards" and is, therefore,
unconstitutional.
However, neither plaintiffs1 Complaint nor their
Amended Complaint alleges lack of adequate standards as a
basis for constitutional disqualification of the Act. Moreover, in over a year's time, from the filing of their Complaint until entry of the lower Court1s order granting plainDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
tiffs1 motion
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judgment,
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to amend their Complaint in order to allege the adequate standards issue.

Likewise, neither plaintiffs1 arguments in the

lower Court nor the lower Court's order, drafted by plaintiffs1 counsel, granting plaintiffs1 motion for summary
judgment mentions

the adequate standards issue.

Under similar circumstances this Court has stated:
Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose is the
final settlement of controversies, requires that
a party must present his entire case and his
theory or theories of recovery to the trial court;
and having done so, he cannot thereafter change
to some different theory and thus attempt to keep
in motion a merry-go-round of litigation. Simpson
v. General Motors Corp., 470 P.2d 399, 401 (Utah
1970).
A long line of Utah cases has affirmed and reaffirmed the
principle that matters neither raised in pleadings nor put
in issue at lower court proceedings cannot be considered for
the first time on appeal.

See, e.g., Wagner v. Olsen, 482

P.2d 702, 705 (Utah 1971); In re Estate of Ekker, 432 P.2d
45, 46 (Utah 1967); Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 375 P.2d 456,
457 (Utah 1962); Carson v. Douglas, 367 P.2d 462, 463 (Utah
1962); Huber v. Deep Creek Irrigation Co., 305 P.2d 478, 479
(Utah 1956); and Flemetis v. McArthur, 226 P.2d 124, 127
(Utah 1951).

Cases from other jurisdictions reflect a similar

concern for the judicial economy and notice requirements
which are the basis of this rule.

See, e.g., Knudson v.

Hilzer, 551 P.2d 680, 686 (Wyo. 1976) (constitutionality
of automobile guest statute not considered when raised for
i

first time on appeal); Johnson v. Doran, 540 P.2d 306, 311
(Mont. 1975)
(right
toW.jury
issue
improperly
raised for
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first time on appeal); Vaughn v. Murrayy 521 P.2d 262, 267268 (Kan. 1974) (challenge to constitutionality of automobile
guest statute improperly raised for first time on appeal);
Talps v. Arreola, 521 P.2d 206 (Wash. 1974) (constitutionality
of possessory chattel lien statute improperly raised for first
time on appeal); Peoples National Bank of Washington v. Peterson,
514 P.2d 159, 162-164 (Wash. 1973) (constitutional questions
relative to self-help and prejudgment attachment remedies
under Uniform Commercial Code improperly raised for first
time on appeal); and State v. Bruno, 378 P.2d 691, 698-699
(Wash. 1963) (unlawful delegation of State legislative power
to State Board of Education issue not considered when raised
for first time on appeal).
These authorities support defendants' contention
that plaintiffs1 adequate standard argument has been improperly raised on this appeal and that, therefore, the Court
should not consider this argument in passing on the constitutionality of the Utah Act.
ARGUMENT V
THE UTAH FIREFIGHTERS NEGOTIATIONS ACT DOES NOT
DELEGATE STATE LEGISLATIVE POWER, AND, IF THE ACT DOES
DELEGATE STATE LEGISLATIVE POWER, ADEQUATE STANDARDS ACCOMPANY THAT DELEGATION.
Even if the Court considers plaintiffs1 adequate
standards argument, this argument cannot provide a basis for
declaring the Act unconstitutional.
reasons.

This is true for several
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First, plaintiffs1 adequate standards argument
incorrectly assumes that the Act delegates State legislative
power to the arbitration board.
given to the board.

Legislative power is not

Instead, the board "arbitrates" firefighter/

city collective bargaining disputes.

Arbitration is pre-

eminently a judicial or quasi-judicial and not a legislative
function.

See, e.g., Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co. v.

Lake Washington Shipyards, 96 P.2d 257, 260 (Wash. 1939)
("An arbitration proceeding is judicial in nature, and its
basic requisite, like that of all English and American
jurisprudence, is that persons whose rights and obligations
are affected thereby have an absolute right to be heard and
to present their evidences, after reasonable notice of the
time and place of the hearing") and Produce Refrigerator Co.
v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. S o c , 97 N.W. 875, 876 (Minn.
1904) ("An arbitration is a judicial proceeding, and the
arbitrators, being alike the agents of both parties, and not
of one party alone, are bound to exercise a high degree of
judicial impartiality, without the slightest regard to the
manner in which the duty was devolved upon them"). Arbitration boards do not make law in any legislative sense, see
City of Everett v. Fire Fighters, Local No. 350 of the International Association of Fire Fighters, 555 P.2d 418, 420
(Wash. 1976) ("No authority is cited which holds that the
resolution of a labor dispute by an arbitration panel constitutes a law ••.") and State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local No.
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(Wyo. 1968) ("...

we find nothing which would suggest or

indicate that ... arbitrators ... have been delegated any
power to make laws or legislate"); and it appears that factual
adjudications by an arbitration board would be permitted
under Utah's version of the adequate standards doctrine.
See Clayton v. Bennett, 298 P.2d 531, 535 (Utah 1956) (,,f[The
Legislature] may confer upon ... administrative officers ...
the duty of determining the question of the existence of
certain facts upon which the effect or execution of its
legislative policy may be dependent . . . l f l ) .

See also,

Revne v. Trade Commission, 192 P.2d 563, 567 (Utah 1948)
("We recognize, of course, that the Legislature may properly
delegate to some administrative body the duty of ascertaining
the facts upon which the provisions of a law are to function
...w).

As one commentator has recognized:

"By authorizing

and requiring collective bargaining [or even by authorizing
a public employer to unilaterally dictate labor standards], a
Legislature has, in fact, delegated to the public employer
some of the power to determine wages that it formerly exercised.
Thus, ... further delegation of power to an arbitrator is a
logical next step."

A. McAvoy, "Binding Arbitration of

Contract Terms: A New Approach to the Resolution of Disputes
in the Public Sector," 72 Col. L. Rev. 1192, 1205 (1972).
Second, even if the Court determines that arbitration under the Act involves legislative as well as judicial
functions, arbitration is a uniquely complex process and this
complexity militates against application of the adequate
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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standards doctrine to the Act.

Thus, this Court upheld the

constitutionality of Utah's professional licensing statute
against an adequate standards challenge because:
... It is not to be expected that any director
of registration would have sufficient knowledge
of all of such occupations to prescribe the
standards and qualifications for them, particularly in view of the fact that with respect to
some of them there is constant change. Clayton
v. Bennett, 298 P.2d 531, 534 (Utah 1956).
The Court noted that, under these circumstances, delegation
of the power to prescribe appropriate standards for license
applicants was a "convenient and desirable expedient."

Id.

Elaborating on this point, the Court quotes approvingly from
Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1937):
"The statute provides that the examination
shall be before a board of practicing dentists,
that the applicant must be a graduate of a
reputable dental school, and that he must be
of good moral character. Thus, the general
standard of fitness and the character and
scope of the examination are clearly indicated. Whether the applicant possesses the
qualifications inherent in that standard is
a question of fact ... . The decision of that
fact involves ordinarily the determination of
two subsidiary questions of fact: The first,
what the knowledge and skill is which fits
one to practice the profession; the second,
whether the applicant possesses that knowledge
and skill. The latter finding is necessarily
an individual one. The former is ordinarily
one of general application. Kence it can,be
embodied in rules. The Legislature itself
may make this finding of the facts of general
application, and by embodying it in the statute
make it law. When it does so, the function of
the examining board is limited to determining
whether the applicant complies with the requirement so declared. But the Legislature need not
make this general finding. To determine the
subjects of which one must have knowledge in
order to be fit to practice dentistry, the extent
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of knowledge in each subject; the degree of
skill requisite; and the procedure to be
followed in conducting the examination—these
are matters appropriately committed to an
administrative board ... and a Legislature
may, consistently with the Federal constitution, delegate to such board the function
of determining these things, as well as the
functions of determining whether the
applicant complies with the detailed standard
of fitness." Clayton v. Bennett, 298 P.2d
531, 534-535 (Utah 1956).
See also, Skelton v. Lees, 329 P.2d 389, 394 (Utah 1958)
("...

[the] Legislature could delegate to a properly qualified

and constituted commission the determination of standards for
such a profession in order to protect the interests of the
public"),
More recently, this Court has followed the Bennett
rationale in upholding the Utah Air Conservation Act against
an adequate standards attack.

See Lloyd A. Fry Co. v. Utah

Air Conservation Committee, 545 P.2d 495 (Utah 1975).

The

Fry opinion emphasized the newness, complexity, breadth, and
specialized, evolving nature of air pollution control as a
basis for relaxation of the adequate standards doctrine.
"In the case before us we are involved with
air pollution control, a subject which is
fairly new to the law and yet more and more
important to the public welfare. By its very
nature it defies the establishment of precise
standards. It involves a highly specialized
science, and yet covers an exceedingly broad
spectrum. It is complex and not reducible to
easy equations, particularly in view of our
constantly growing knowledge and understanding
of-our environment and its effect upon our
lives and our very existence. Recognizing
these facts, the Legislature acted to prohibit
or control air contamination to the extent
possible in the interest of health and the
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enjoyment of life or property. It is true
that the standards set forth are broad, but
they are nonetheless adequate." Icl. at 500.
See also, Kesler and Sons Construction Co. v. Utah State
Division of Health, 513 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Utah 1973)

("...

speaking generally, we do not believe a statute authorizing
the Department of Health to promulgate regulations which are
reasonable and purposed to protect the public health is an
improper delegation of legislative power") and Lauren W.
Gibbs v. Monson, 129 P.2d 887, 891-892 (Utah 1942) ("unworthiness" held to be sufficient standard for canceling securities
broker-dealer license in light of Utah Blue Sky law policy).
Defendants submit that similar reasoning should be
invoked to constitutionally validate the Utah Act.

Arbitra-

tion involves complex factual determinations in an environment of constant economic change.

It was, therefore, unneces-

sary and, indeed, it may have been imprudent, for the Legislature to enumerate general findings or standards to guide the
arbitration board in the exercise of its decision-making
powers.

Instead, the Act makes a fundamental policy determina-

tion, i.e., that impasses in firefighter/city collective
bargaining disputes shall be resolved, not by the present
adversary method with its potential for disruption of essential services, but by a mutual reasoned appeal to an impartial arbitrator.

Referring disputes to such an arbi-

trator is not delegating legislative power.

On the con-

trary, it represents a flexible rather than straitjacket
approach to the implementation of policy already set by the
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in the public sector appears to be at least as definite as
the "reasonableness" or "worthiness" standards which have
been tolerated by this Court in Fry and Monson.

Courts from

other jursidctions are in accord with this sentiment.

See

City of East Providence v. Local 850, International
Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, 366 A.2d 1151f 1155
(R.I. 1976) (legislative policy of providing firefighters
with labor rights other than the right to strike is sufficient in itself to withstand adequate standards constitutional
attack); Harney v. Russo, 255 A.2d 560, 563 (Pa. 1969)
(strike prevention policy sufficient to withstand adequate
standards constitutional challenge:

"To require a more ex-

plicit statement of legislative policy in a statute calling
for labor arbitration would be sheer folly.

The great advan-

tage of arbitration is, after all, the ability of the arbitrators to deal with each case on its merits in order to arrive
at a compromise which is fair to both parties"); and State
ex rel. Fire Fighters Local No. 946, I.A.F.F. v. City of
Laramie, 437 P.2d 295, 300 (Wyo. 1968) (Pragmatic "doctrine
of necessity" employed to sustain arbitration statute without any standards:

"... if the Legislature sees fit to

provide for genuine collective bargaining, an essential
adjunct to the bargaining is a provision for unresolved
matters to be submitted to arbitration or determined in some
other manner").

See also, Fairview Hospital Association v.

Public Bldg. Ser. & Hosp. Employees Union Local 113, 64 N.W.2d
16 (1954).
-43-
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Furthermore, the Act's use of certain terms, a
factor which was heavily emphasized in Fry, provides guidance
for the arbitration board.

Thus, the Act employs terms such

as "wages, hours, and other conditions of employment," see
Utah Code Ann. § 34-20a-3 (Supp. 1975) and "good faith"
collective bargaining, see Utah Code Ann. § 34-20a-5 (Supp.
1975) . These terms of art in labor relations law can serve
not only to define the scope of firefighter/city collective
bargaining but also to ascertain whether certain firefighter/
city collective bargaining disputes are arbitrable.

See,

e.g., Pontiac Police Officers Association v. City of Pontiac,
246 N.W.2d 831 (Mich. 1976) (grievance and other disciplinary procedures are "other terms and conditions of employment" and are, therefore, mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining) and Fire Fighters Union, Local 1186, I.A.F.F.
v. City of Vallejo, 526 P.2d 971, 978-980 (Col. 1974) (firefighter manning procedure arbitrable insofar as it affects
employee safety and does not impinge upon city management's
power to direct fire prevention policy).
Finally, defendants submit that, even assuming the
existence of some deficiency in the Act's substantive standards, the Act has adequate procedural safeguards to prevent
arbitrary decision-making by the arbitration board.
In Fry, the Court pointed approvingly to a
Pennsylvania decision which held that appeal provisions in
an Act are a sufficient procedural hedge against arbitrary
administrative action.
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This concept is in accord with the view expressed
by [1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise
§ 2.09 at 113 (1958)] that the law of delegation
would be strengthened if the courts were to deemphasize statutory standards and to emphasize
the degree of procedural safeguards. "... putting
some words into a statute that a court can call
a legislative standard is not a very good
protection against arbitrariness. The protections that are effective are hearings with procedural safeguards, legislative supervision and
judicial reivew ... ." Lloyd A, Fry Co. v. Utah
Air Conservation Committee, 545 P.2d 495, 501
(Utah 1975) .
Other judicial opinions echo the Fry rationale:
There is no constitutional requirement that all
delegation of legislative power must be accompanied
by a statement of standards circumscribing its
exercise. It is true that a contrary view has
frequently been expressed in the adjudicated cases,
particularly the earlier ones, but the position
taken in such cases is not defensible. It is now
apparent that the requirement of expressed standards has, in most instances, been little more
than a judicial fetish for legislative language,
the recitation of which provides no additional
safeguards to persons affected by the exercise of
the delegated authority .... As pointed out in
Davis on administrative lav;, the important consideration is not whether the statute delegating the power
expresses standards, but whether the procedure
established for the exercise of the power furnishes
adequate safeguards to those who are affected by
the administrative action. Warren v. Marion
County, 353 P.2d 257, 261 (Ore. 1960).
The Act details the procedure for selection of the
arbitration board and plaintiff municipalities are given
substantial input relative to that selection process.
Utah Code Ann. § 34-20a-8 (Supp. 1975).

See

Moreover, the Act is

probably subject to the Utah Administrative Rule-making Act,
see Utah Code Ann. § 63-46-3(1) (Supp. 1975).

This means

that the arbitration board, even an ad hoc arbitration board,
must adopt and promulgate procedural rules.

See Utah Code
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Ann. §§ 63-46-4 (b) and (c) and 63-46-11 (Supp. 1975).

The

adequacy of these rules may be challenged in an action for
declaratory judgment.
1975).

See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46-9 (Supp.

And the arbitration board impliedly must write and

publish its opinions in particular arbitration proceedings.
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46-4(d) (Supp. 1975).

Presumably

these opinions would be subject to judicial review.
Since procedural safeguards alone are sufficient
to satisfy the adequate standards doctrine, defendants submit
that the Act is constitutionally sound on this point.
ARGUMENT VI
THE UTAH FIREFIGHTERS NEGOTIATIONS ACT DOES NOT
VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEES OF EITHER THE UTAH OR
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
Plaintiffs argue that the Act violates equal
protection guarantees of the Utah and United States Constitutions , in that it does not extend collective bargaining and
compulsory arbitration benefits to policemen as well as to
firefighters.

Defendants have two observations relative

to this argument.
(1)

Plaintiffs do not have standing to raise the

equal protection issue.

The Utah Declaratory Judgment Act,

under which plaintiffs are bringing the present action,
requires a party to have some adversarial interest in the
outcome of litigation before he has standing to participate
in such litigation. See Utah Code Ann. '§§ 78-33-2 and 78-33-11.
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(1953).

Thus, in Backman v. Salt Lake County/ 375 P.2d

756, 753 (Utah 1962), this Court held that "... a judgment
can be rendered only in a real controversy between adverse
parties ... [and] the interests of the parties must be
adverse ... .

[Tlhe party seeking ... relief must have a

legally protectable interest in the controversy."

See also,

Main Parking Mall v. Salt Lake City Corp., 531 P.2d 866
(Utah 1975), and Lyon v. Bateman, 228 P.2d 818 (Utah 1951).
If the Act denies equal protection to anyone, it
denies equal protection to policemen and other municipal
employees and not to the plaintiff municipalities themselves.
Equal protection interest in the present case, therefore,
runs to policemen and other municipal employees and not to
the plaintiff municipalities.

If that interest is to be asserted

through the judicial process, it must be asserted by the
parties possessing such interest.

This is the essence of

constitutional standing requirements as well as the standing
requirement of Utah's Declaratory Judgment Act.
Not only are plaintiffs not policemen, but also
plaintiffs1 interest with respect to the Act is diametrically
opposed to the policemen's interests.

See Affidavit of David

Wesley in the Record at 192-194. Therefore, if plaintiffs
insist on pretending to represent Utah's policemen (representation which is both unauthorized and fraught with a
conflict of interest) , the Court must conclude that plaintiffs
lack standing to raise the equal protection issue because
the police are in sympathy with and not opposed to the Act.
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(2)

The Act does not unreasonably discriminate

between firefighters and other municipal employees.

Even if

we assume that plaintiffs can effectively represent the
policemen's interests and if we further assume that the
policemen's interests are adversarial relative to the Act,
the Act does not violate equal protection guarantees of
either the Utah or the United States Constitution,

This is

because the Act's discrimination between firefighters and
other municipal employees is reasonable.
In Illinois Assn, of Fire Fighters, Local 73 v, City
of Waukegan, 226 N.E.2d 606 (111. 1967), defendant city
challenged a non-binding arbitration provision because "the
statute makes an unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional,
classification of municipal employees in that it affords
firemen an arbitration procedure not available to other
municipal employees,"
ily that:

Id. at 607.

The Court noted preliminar-

"When a legislative classification is challenged

as violating [equal protection guarantees], the 'unreasonableness and rationality of the class1 governs its validity
[citation omitted]" and that a "'distinction in legislation
is not arbitrary, if any state of facts can reasonably be
conceived that would sustain it ... .'"
Id. at 608.

[Citation omitted.]

Then the Court concluded that:

So measured, the challenged statute is constitutional. Statutes which make distinctions among
public employees have frequently been sustained.
Pensions for retired school teachers have been upheld
against the challenge that they violated [equal
protection guarantees] by providing to some employees
an annuity not available to others [citation omitted].
The Civil Service Act was sustained against the
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excluding them from its provisions requiring charges
interfering as a condition to discharges [citation
omitted]. A statute fixing minimum wages for
firemen is valid [citation omitted]. ..• We are
unable to say that the General Assembly's belief
that the arbitration procedure it has provided
will enhance the possibility of hiring and retaining
firemen is unreasonable, or that it could not reasonably conclude that the need for such a procedure
is greater in the case of firemen than other public
employees. The constitutional provision here
invoked was not intended to preclude legislative
innovation or to prevent the gradual application
of new techniques in the solution of governmental
problems. Id. at 608.
The Court in Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v.
City of Los Angeles, 384 P.2d 158 (Cal. 1963) rejected a
similar equal protection argument raised by the City of Los
Angeles;
Defendant ... argues that singling out firefighters
from all other public employees is, per se, arbitrary, discriminatory, and without reasonable
justification. Of course, the authority and duty
to ascertain the facts which will justify class
legislation lies with the Legislature and not with
the courts [citation omitted] and the Legislature
is vested with a wide discretion in adopting classifications to which any particular statute is made
applicable [citations omitted] and every presumption
is in favor of its validity [citations omitted].
In enacting the instant labor code sections, the
Legislature undoubtedly had in mind many logical
distinctions between fire fighters and other public
employees. By Government Code §§ 3500-3509,
inclusive, it granted to all public employees
the right to join labor unions, but therein provided that the employing agencies might except
police from operation of the statute. No one can
doubt that the denial of the overall benefits to
the police was a reasonable denial of benefits and
privileges to a class of persons charged with
duties which might be inimicable [sic] to union
membership. At the same time, the Legislature
stated [citation omitted] that fire fighters should
not be subject to the same exceptions as provided
in the case of police. Realizing that the duties
of fire fighters differed sufficiently from those
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of public employees in general, and yet not sufficiently to except them in toto from the benefit of
organization, the Legislature set forth their rights
and obligations in a similar (but slightly different)
legislative enactment [citation omitted]. It cannot be said that the distinctions therein are any
more arbitrary or without reasonable basis than the
many other legislative distinctions predicated
upon specific occupations. The arguments of
defendant fail to recognize the rule that, when a
legislative classification is questioned, if any
state of facts reasonably can be conceived that
would sustain it, there is a presumption of the existence of that state of facts, and the burden of
showing arbitrary action rests upon the one who
assails the class [citation omitted]. Id. at
165-66.
In State ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool, 441
S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1969), the defendant city claimed that a

(

statute extending "meet and confer" benefits to certain
public employees but excluding policemen violated equal protection or special law provisions of the Missouri State
Constitution.

The Court rejected this claim:

With respect to the charge of arbitrary and unconstitutional classification in the exclusion of
police, deputy sheriffs, highway patrolmen, national
guardsmen, and teachers from benefits of the Act,
it is noted that, except for teachers, the excluded
class is that of police or those exercising police
functions and, as such, are an appropriate classification, being sui generis [citation omitted] ....
Note also that when a legislative classification is
questioned, if any state of facts reasonably can
be conceived that would sustain it, there is a
presumption of the existence of that state of facts,
and the burden of showing arbitrary action rests
upon the one who assails the classification
[citations omitted]. Id. at 43.
In Utah, the duties, risks, and hazards of firefighters are unique from other city employees.

The equipment

and training of firefighters differ from all other city
employees.

*

Firefighters work a twenty-four hour shift and a
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fifty-six hour week, whereas other city employees work an
eight hour day and a forty hour week.

Often Utah cities

enter into service contracts with other Utah cities and
counties for the provision of fire protection to each other
in times of emergency or disaster.

There is a different

community of interest among firefighters as compared with
other city employees.
Other states have approached the problem of public
employee labor relations by first establishing a Firefighters
Negotiation Act in order to study the impact of such legislation before providing collective bargaining or compulsory
arbitration to public employees on a broader scale.

It seems

entirely reasonable for Utah also to follow this trial-anderror approach to collective bargaining and compulsory arbitration in the public sector.
Finally, the Salt Lake City Revised Ordinances,
Titles 14 and 25, also delineate distinctions between firefighters and other municipal employees claimed by plaintiffs
to be "invidious" and "arbitrary" discrimination in the
present case.

Plaintiff Salt Lake City undoubtedly had some

rational basis for creating these distinctions at the time
it enacted said ordinances, and undoubtedly these distinctions
were grounded in the relative necessity of the public services
performed by firefighters

as opposed to the necessity of

services performed by other municipal employees.

In other

words, given the extremely essential character of fire prevention and protection, the State here decided to establish
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-M-

a procedural means for the settlement of labor disputes
between cities and firefighters which would preclude or
substantially lessen the possibility of a strike amongst firefighters.

The fact that the means chosen are wise or improvi-

dent, or that they may or may not be as effective as some
other means to forestall strikes by firefighters is, of course,
not a matter for judicial inquiry.

Some rational relationship

between the legislation and its purpose is all that is
required in order to withstand plaintiffs1 equal protection
challenge.
Similarly, plaintiffs claim that the exclusion
of fire chiefs, assistant chiefs, battalion or deputy chiefs
captains, or lieutenants from the union negotiating team
denies these individuals equal protection seems unfounded.
The Act does not expressly preclude them from playing an
active role in union politics or from participation in democratic selection of the negotiating team.

In addition,

these individuals are viewed by the city as part of the fire
department's managerial echelon.

Therefore, Utah Code

Ann. § 34-20a-4 (Supp. 1975) represents a reasonable legislative compromise between these individuals1 need for union
membership and plaintiffs' need to avoid embarrassment and
hampered working relations between city officers and fire
department management which might result from putting fire
department management members in a confrontive, negotiating
posture vis a vis said city officers.
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Here again the Court must conclude that plaintiffs
have not sustained their burden of proving the unreasonableness of the Act's firefighter/city municipal employees
classification.

Plaintiffs do not cite a single authority

which deals with factual situations similar to those found
in the present case.

Instead, plaintiffs rely on rhetorical

flourishes to prove their equal protection point:

"... the

writer would be very interested in learning of any distinction which makes the Salt Lake City employees working in the
fire department unique or distinguished from any other class
of municipal employees ... ."

Plaintiffs' Brief at 39.

However, plaintiffs' idle speculation cannot rebut the Act's
presumption of constitutionality.
ARGUMENT VII
THE UTAH FIREFIGHTERS NEGOTIATIONS ACT DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE ONE-PERSON ONE-VOTE RULE OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
Plaintiffs' Brief at 42-44 argues that the Utah
Act violates the one-person one-vote rule.

However, this

argument proceeds from a false assumption:

That the

arbitration board "has the power to compel the levying of
taxes."

See plaintiff's Brief at 42. Plaintiffs cite no

authority in support of this assumption; and, indeed, the
only available authority on this point is contra.

See City

of Spokane v. Spokane Police Guild, 553 P.2d 1316, 13181319 (Wash. 1976) and Dearborn Fire Fighters Union, Local
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No, 412, I.A.F.F. v. City of Dearborn, 231 N.W.2d 226, 230
(Mich. 1975).
In addition to plaintiffs' unsupported "taxation
without representation" assumption, plaintiffs build their
one-person one-vote argument on one fragile reed:

City of

Amsterdam v. Helsby, 362 N.Y.S.2d 698 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
However, the Helsby opinion was summarily reversed in City of
Amsterdam v. Helsby, 332 N.E.2d 290 (New York 1975).

Every

other reported decision which has considered this issue has
rejected plaintiffs' contention.

See Town of Arlington v.

Board of Conciliation and Arbitration, 352 N.E.2d 914, 920921 (Mass. 1976) and Harney v. Russo, 255 A.2d 560, 563564 (Pa. 1969).
Defendants conclude that plaintiffs1 one-person
one-vote argument is without merit.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, defendants
respectfully submit that the lower court's judgment in the
present case should be reversed as requested by defendants
on this appeal and that the Utah Firefighters Negotiations
Act should be declared constitutional by this Court.
DATED this 10th day of February, 1977.
IRVINE SMITH & MABEY
Attorneys for Defendants

^u^:--:;:-

By

'

Jerry W. James

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that a copy of
the foregoing was mailed on the 11th day of February, 1977
to:

Roger F. Cutler, 101 City and County Building, Salt Lake

City, Utah 84111; Glen J, Ellis, Box 1097, Provo, Utah 84601;
Jack A. Richards, P.O. Box 9699, Ogden, Utah 84409; Merrill
G. Hansen, 5461 South State Street, Murray, Utah 84107; and
J. Blaine Zollinger, 61 West First North, Logan, Utah 84 321.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-55-

